RE Policy and Politics, Mallon, 2006 - Country Case Studies

Gordon Edge (2006). "A Harsh Environment: The Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation and the UK Renewables Industry," in Renewable Energy Policy and Politics, Karl Mallon, ed. London: Earthscan.

• The Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO): In early 1990s, government sold power generators to private interests, but could not sell nuclear because risks were too high. To force distribution companies to buy higher-priced nuclear power, instituted fossil fuel levy (FFL) to make fossil fuels comparable in price to nuclear.
• Eventually (not clear when this happened), NFFO covered only RE, and dropped from 10% to 1%.
• Tender system: Government would bid out renewable energy capacity and would buy largest amt possible with available FFL funds. Technology banding guaranteed a given portion of the funds to each of 5 technologies: large wind, small wind, small hydro, landfill gas, biomass.
• What this system didn't do well: 1) get capacity installed, due to planning boards blocking construction of the facilities; 2) generate domestic development or manufacturing, since Denmark and Germany had lowest-cost technology; 3) engender confidence in bidders, since no one knew when next round would be or how many contracts would be awarded
• NFFO ended in 1998 - the Renewables Obligation came into force in 2002: mandates electricity suppliers to supply set proportion of sales from RE or trade in certificates to meet quota.
• Downsides of RO: 1) Technology-blind, so promotes least cost technology - mostly wind right now; 2) potential for market in certificates to crash if more RE is produced than is mandated (supply for certs will outweigh demand and very little would be paid for certificates, apparently haven't had this problem yet); 3) Has attracted foreign manufacturers to set up operations in UK, but not domestic industry
• Need coordination in policymaking, including planning, transmission, grid connection
• Declared Net Capacity: nameplate capacity multiplied by capacity factor. Wind 0.43; Solar 0.17; Tidal 0.33; Small hydro 0.55; 1 for all others

Randall Swisher and Kevin Porter (2006). "Renewable Policy Lessons from the US: The Need for Consistent and Stable Policies," in Renewable Energy Policy and Politics, Karl Mallon, ed. London: Earthscan.

• On policies for wind energy production in U.S. Good, concise description of experiences with PURPA and PTC. Says PTC is not a market maker, but RPSs are. Description of success of TX's RPS. Describes success of wind production under FITs DE and DK, but ascribes success to consistency rather than the policy, per se. Concludes that FITs would not be politically feasible in US, so well-designed RPS way to go. Points to large number of top-10 wind turbine manufacturers in DK, DE, SP (7) as evidence of success of policies there. US only has 1.

Jose Luis Garcia Ortega and Emilio Menendez Perez (2006). "Spanish Renewable Energy: Successes and Untapped Potential," in Renewable Energy Policy and Politics, Karl Mallon, ed. London: Earthscan.

• Energy demand outpacing additions of RE; lack of energy efficiency programs. GHG emission permitted to rise by 15% for 2008-12 Kyoto commitment period (above 1990 levels?) reached 40% above by 2003. Emissions from transport sector fastest growing. Highly dependent on oil imports, and nuclear generates 1/3 of electricity.
• Objectives for RE are 1) energy independence, 2) jobs, 3) environmental concerns.
• Advocates of RE included independent developers that had formed an umbrella association to make their voice heard and environmental groups. In 1992, an agreement formed between a nationwide environmental organization and two major national unions, calling for 750MW target for wind when a gov't energy institute was calling for 175MW (not sure by when). Legislation enacted in 1994, updated in 1998 and 2004, guarantees premium payments for RE.
• Spanish states have various initiatives and targets of their own. Galicia has 2300MW wind target, w/ aim of ensuring 70 percent of investment spent within the state. Resulted in 5000 direct and indirect jobs, numerous factories. Twenty percent of Spanish population lives in cities that require solar thermal for hot water in new buildings.
• Approxiately 10,000 jobs in Spanish wind industry. Blade manufacture creates 1000 direct jobs in seven factories. 1000 jobs in small O&M enterprises all over country. Solar power employs about 4000 people, with 3/4 in small O&M enterprises. PV module manufacturing requires more than 1000 workers, 15% grads of higher ed. Biomass generation requires equivalent of 5000 full time workers, but most labor complementary to work collecting agricultural waste in rural areas.
• Missing 2 pages (224-225) here
• Spain now world leader in solar thermal electric - incentives not in place in 1994/1998, but industry growing now.
• Gap between R&D institutes and industry - companies seek technology from outside the country. Holds up Solar Energy Institute as example of successful R&D/industry integration. Spanish mkt uses 4% of PV modules made in Europe; 95% of PV module output is exported.

Sven Teske and Volker U. Hoffman (2006). "A History of Support for Solar Photovoltaics in Germany," in Renewable Energy Policy and Politics, Karl Mallon, ed. London: Earthscan.

• Spending on energy research between 1974-1995 displays assumption that nuclear power would be energy source of 21st century. Nuclear fusion failed to deliver anything approaching commercial power applications.
• Thousand roofs program began 1991 - solar generators with capacities of 1 to 5 KW eligible for 70% investment cost subsidy. Of 4000 applications, 2100 installations in operation at end of 1995. Program was chance to prove concept, raise awareness, facilitate cost reductions, demonstrate what needed to be changed in future (subsidy tied to output rather than capacity).
• No successor program when it ended in 1995. Author calls 1995-1999 "the dark ages." Uninterupted subsidy program in North Rhine-Westphalia, and mixture of less steady support in other regions, prevented market from collapsing altogether. Market for PV tripled in two years following 1995 - authors owes this to state supports and campaigns of environmental groups and solar manufacturers.
• 100,000 solar roofs program began in Nov 1999 w/ no-interest loan for 100% of total investment. Not impetus enough until Renewable Energy Law in 2000 included solar PV in portfolio of RE eligible for FITs. Target was met in June 2003, and no-interests loans not continued.
• New Renewable Energy Law came into force in 2004 guarantees prices to users solar PV high enough to attract installation. By this time, no separate state supports.
• Main message seems to be importance of stability, and this author believes the FITs is most effective option.